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I. INTRODUCTION

In a world consumed with the possibility of alien activity,' we are currently
ignoring the possibility of a major ecological 2 and economic 3 catastrophy posed by

the introduction of alien exotic species. Specifically, in the marine environment,
the international shipping industry is transporting various marine species around the
globe without considering the possible ramifications.
"In 1986 or late 1985 a ship leaving a freshwater European port for North
America began to take on ballast. It opened the sea cocks and started the pumps. A
thriving population inhabited the harbor from which the ship drew the ballast, and
members of that population came aboard along with the water. Alas, for North
America, one of them was a hardy Asian bivalve named Dreissena polymorpha, the
zebra mussel, which over a 150-year period had spread from the region of the
Caspian Sea into much of Europe, plugging water pipes and clamping onto the hulls
of boats as it went. The unknown ship that carried D. Polymorpha across the
Atlantic was headed for the St. Lawrence Seaway. Past Quebec City, it sailed, past
Montreal, past Toronto, and on through Lake Erie. When the ship finally reached
its destination and flushed its ballast, somewhere above Detroit, a founding
population of zebra mussels tumbled into Lake St. Clair, and a new continent." 6
Although this particular example took place in the United States, the same
events are occurring worldwide.' Upon consideration and realization of the damage
being done, various domestic and international governments have initiated legislation to address the situation! Although such legislation is desirable, the real world
difficulties and challenges of enforcement leave the distinct potential that one of
these destructive exotic species could breach these legislative defenses, thus

1. See Joshua Reichert, Alien Invaders in U.S. Waters-What Defenders Must Do, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 7, 1997, opinion/essays at 19 (comparing alien threats in movies with current threats posed by
marine organisms).
2.
See David Perlman, Shellfish-GobblingCrab Spreads North to Oregon Predator'sPresenceAlarms
Biologists, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 1997, at Al (describing the serious disruption to the ecology of estuarine waters
brought on by the introduction of the alien Green Crab who preys upon local shellfish); see also Mark A. Stein,
Natives Crowded Out, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1989, sl, at I (reporting that devastation of ecosystems by the
introduction of exotic species, thereby creating monocultures in which only one time of plant or animal flourishes).
3.
See generallyJohn Ross, Zebra Mussels: iIny Invaders with Gigantic Clout, SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 1994,
at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost the United States US$5 billion by 2000).
4.
See Daniel P. Larsen, Comment, Combating the Exotic Species Invasion: The Role of Tort Liability, 5
DUKEENVTL L. &POL'YF. 21,21 n.1 (1995) (defining the term "exotic species" as a plant or animal species which
is found outside of their native habitat); see also infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (detailing harmful effects
of exotic species introduction).
5.
See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of exotic species introduction).
6.
See Matthew Hart, Invasion of the Zebra Mussels, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1990, at 81.
7.
See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (detailing the international effects of exotic species
introduction).
8.
See generally 1 & 2 GREGORIOS J. TIMAGENIS LL.M., PH.D, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE
POLLUTION (1980) (providing a broad overview of international attempts at pollution regulation).
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wreaking havoc on local property owners 9 and the fishing industry.'° Despite all the
governmental action, when one species slips through the legislative defenses or
when enforcement fails, someone is left paying the bill."
If the owner of a ship responsible for harmful exotic species introduction is
subject to liability, the reality of such current or impending liability will encourage
the swift development of effective prevention methods.12 If no liability is found,
impacted property owners will be forced to bear the development costs of
preventative technologies and provide them to the shipping industry to avoid such
a risk. 13 Under both scenarios the ultimate goal of exotic species introduction prevention is achieved. 14 In addition, the final resolution of liability will also allow
both parties to avoid costly litigation, and use the saved capital in a more efficient
manner-such as funding preventative technology development. 5 Considering the
of a private party
twin goals of prevention and economic efficiency, the viability
16
considered.
be
must
species
exotic
of
introduction
the
suit for
Therefore, it is desirable for injured parties to be able to bring a private suit
against the owner of a ship responsible for exotic species introduction. 17 This suit
would preferably be brought under the common law of the country, and thus this is
applied to an old problem, rather, it is old
not a situation where new law is being
18
problem.
new
a
to
applied
law being
This Comment discusses the viability of a private party suit brought by the
English fishing industry against an individual owner of a ship responsible for
releasing harmful exotic species in local waters, in order to redress damages and
encourage the prohibition of exotic species introduction. This Comment examines
England because of the wide applicability of its common law in other countries.
Section II provides a background of how the problem of exotic species introduction

9.
See Ross, supra note 3, at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost the United
States $5 billion by 2000).
L. REV. 603,604
10. See M. Casey Jarman, Marine Pollution: Injury Without a Remedy?, 24 SAN D ,EGO
(1987) (describing the adverse affect of pollution on the fishing industry and the possible remedies available in the
United States).
11. See Ross, supranote 3, at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost the United
States US$5 billion by 2000).
12. See generallyJim Ritter, Alien InvadersDisruptLake Life; Solutions to Stowaway Species Studied,Can.
SUN-TIMEs, Aug. 18, 1996, at 36 (outlining the current proposals for elimination of exotic species, which include
stainless steel screens, chemicals, heat, electric pulses, ultraviolet light, sound waves, magnetic treatment, and
oxygen starvation).
13. fa
14. Id.
15. Id.
16.

See GEORGE NEWSOM, Q.C. &J. GRAHAM SHERRATrB.Sc., M.CHEM.A., F.R.I.C., WATER POLLUTION

1 (1972) (claiming that civil remedies are the most efficient method of environmental protection in a pollution
context); see also id. at vi (touting the importance of the private civil action in the protection of waterways in
England).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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occurs, the effects of the problem, and the utility of a private suit as a method of
enforcement. 19 Section Im explains public and private nuisance law in England and

applies it to exotic species introduction.2° Finally, section IV concludes that contingent upon causation, the owner of a ship introducing a harmful exotic species
may be found liable in England.2'

II. BACKGROUND
To properly evaluate a suit brought against the owner of a ship which introduces a harmful exotic species, it is necessary to understand how the introduction
occurs,2' the subsequent effects of that introduction, and the tactical advantages
of bringing a private suit to prevent the problem.
A. How the Problem Occurs
There have been many advances in shipping due to the advent of new tech-

nology.' Among the many advances is the use of sea water to maintain a constant
buoyancy. 26 Due to the physics of ship movement in water, it is desirable for a boat
to sit lower in the water when leaving harbors because it creates more stability in
the turbulent waters outside a harbor.2 The tremendous weight of cargo normally
functions to keep a ship lowered in the water.28 However, once the cargo is
unloaded, the weight, and hence the stability, is lost.29 Therefore, a system has been

19. See infra notes 22-80 and accompanying text (providing background information on exotic species).
20. See infra notes 81-312 and accompanying text (discussing the application of nuisance law to exotic
species in England).
21. See infra note 313 and accompanying text (concluding a nuisance suit for exotic species introduction
is viable in England).
22. See infra notes 25-58 and accompanying text (detailing how exotic species create a problem).
23. See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (stating the effects of the problem created by exotic
species).
24. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (proposing the advantages of a private party nuisance suit).
25.

See generally Bernhard J. Arbrahamsson, InternationalShipping, Developments,Prospects,and Policy

Issues, 8 OCEAN Y.B. 158, 161 (Elisabeth Mann Borgese, et a. eds., 1989) (acknowledging the technological
changes in the shipping industry).
26.

See UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, SHIPPING STUDY: THE ROLE OF SHIPPING INTHE INTRODUCTION OF

NONINDIGENOUS AQUATIC ORGANISMS TOTHECOASTALWATERS OFTHEUNITED STATES (OTHER THANTHE GREAT
LAKES) AND AN ANALYSIS OF CONTROL OPTIONS 40 (1995) [hereinafter SHIPPING STUDY] (providing a history of

the development of ballast use in shipping); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 297

(19th ed.) (defining buoyancy as "the property of floating on the surface of a liquid or in a fluid: the tendency of
a body to float or rise when submerged in a fluid being dependent upon the excess of the specific gravity of the fluid
over that of the body").
27. See generally Hart,supra note 6,at 81 (providing reasons for modem ballasting techniques).
28.

See John L. Dentler, Comment, Noah's Farce:The Regulation and Controlof Exotic Fish and Wildlife,

17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 191, 196 n.30 (1993) (discussing how ocean going ships use ballast to maintain the
necessary draft and stability for ocean travel).
29.

Id.
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developed for30bringing water into the ship to replace the lost weight and maintain
the buoyancy.
The sea waterpumped into the ship under this system is termed ballast. 3 Ballast
consists of a variety of different material carried by a vessel to provide the
necessary draft and stability.32 Although any variety of material may be used,
33
seawater, because of its ready availability is the predominant source of ballast.
Most often the intake or discharge of seawater ballast takes place at a ship's port-ofcall, the port where the cargo is loaded or unloaded.3
Once at the harbor, the ship's pumps draw in and expel the ballast water when
3
Because of this indisneeded without concern for the contents of that watery.
amounts
of marine life.
in
large
ships
are
drawing
criminate use of seawater,
Accordingly, there are reports of ships with at least 367 distinctly identifiable
taxonomic groups of plants and animals within the ballast water.36 Unfortunately,
this nondiscretionary use of seawater causes the transportation of marine life from
one harbor and ecosystem to other harbors around the globe.37
The introduction of exotic marine species 38 can have serious effects on the
ecology of harbor waters. 39 Each harbor contains a special and individualized ecosystem, with specific species that localize to that specific harbor.40 Prior to the
advent of current technology, the harbor was a sanctuary for those specialized

30. Id.
31. See SHIPPING STUDY, supra note 26, at 40 (providing a history of the development of ballast use in
shipping).
32. See Dentler, supra note 28, at 196 n.30 (discussing how ocean going ships use ballast to maintain the
necessary draft and stability for ocean travel).
33. See SHIPPING STUDY, supra note 26, at 40 (setting forth the interaction between the shipping industry's
use of ballast water and the introduction of exotic species).
34. See Sharrone O'Shea & Allegra Cangelosi, Comment, Trojan Horses in our Harbors: Biological
Contaminationfrom Ballast Water Discharge,27 U. TOL. L. REv. 381, 381 (1996) (describing the history and
current methods of ballast use).
35. See SHIPPING STUDY, supra note 26, at 59 (discussing the contents of ballast water) "The potential
diversity of 'ballastable biota' is often not fully appreciated." Id. "Virtually all aquatic organisms that can occur
in the water column... or be stirred up from bottom sediments, or rubbed off harbor pilings, could be ballasted
into the vessel." Id.
36. See SHIPPING STUDY, supranote 26, at 40 (finding that at least 367 distinct taxonomic groups of plants
and animals have been discovered in ballast water from ships arriving in Oregon from Japan).
37. See O'Shea& Cangelosi, supranote 34, at 381 (detailing the effect of ballast use in ships on the global
spread of exotic species).
38. See Larsen, supranote 4, at 21 n.1 (defining the term "exotic species" as aplant or animal species which
is found outside of their native habitat).
39. See Perlman, supra note 2, at Al (describing the serious disruption to the ecology of estuarine waters
brought on by the introduction of the alien Green Crab); see also Will Ryan, Shell shockers: Zebra mussels are
changingthe fishing in every body of water they colonize; includes related tips, OUTDOOR LIFE, Aug. 1996, at 8
(stating that zebra mussels, an exotic species, are disrupting aquatic food chains and affecting fishing).
40. See JOHNC. BRIGGS,MARINEZOOGEOGRAPHY (1974) (presenting analysis of the worldwide distribution
of marine life). See generally D.H. CUSHING, MARINE ECOLOGY AND FISHERIES (1975) (describing interaction of
marine life and population dynamics); see generally G.V. NIKOLSKY, THE ECOLOGY OF FISHES (L.Birkett trans.,
1963) (discussing the relationship between fish and their natural environment).
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ecosystems. 41 However, modem ballast practice transplants species into these

previously uninvaded ecosystems, thus placing exotic species in new marine
habitats.4 2 Not all of those exotic species survive.43 However, the species that do

survive may benefit from the absence of their natural enemies.44 In the absence of
this ecological check, 45 they are able to proliferate at an exaggerated rate, thereby
changing the ecology of the harbor.4 6
Without natural predators or diseases to control the population, the exotic
species may decrease or even eliminate the population of a native species. 47 A

native species population is affected by either outcompetition for a common food

supply,48 or being preyed upon by an exotic species that is a predator.49 In both
scenarios the effect is a diminished population ofthe native species. 5 Therefore, the
ballast of one ship can bring about catastrophy in a harbor. 51 The effect of exotic
species
is not limited to harbors, rather they threaten to invade the river systems as
52

well.

41. See BRIGGS, supra note 40 (presenting analysis of the worldwide distribution of marine life). See
generally CUSHING, supra note 40 (describing interaction of marine life and population dynamics); see generally
NIKOLSKY, supranote 40 (discussing the relationship between fish and their natural environment).
42. See Nadya Labi, Shiploads of Aliens; Exotic Stowaways Travelfar from Home, Launching Aquatic
Invasions that Wreak Havoc on MarineLife, TIME, Oct. 28, 1996, at 64 (detailing the effect of exotic species on
the fishing industry).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 103-440, at 3 (1994) (reporting that most exotic species do not survive upon
introduction into a new environment).
44. See generally Stein, supra note 2, at I (discussing the effects of the introduction of exotic species
without presence of natural predators).
45. See id. (analyzing the effects of the introduction of exotic species on species native to the invaded harbor
when exotic species are without natural predators); see also Dan McCosh, Aliens among us; zebra mussels in
Michigan'sLake St. Clair,POPULAR SCI., May 1995, at 94 (setting forth how an exotic species negatively affected
an ecosystem without the presence of natural enemies).
46. See Stein, supranote 2,at 1 (reporting that devastation of ecosystems by the introduction of exotic
species creates monocultures in which only one type of plant or animal flourishes).
47. Id.
48. See Labi, supra note 42, at 64 (detailing the effect of exotic species upon the fishing industry by
outcompeting local anchovy population for common food source); see also John Albergo, Zebra mussels invade
the GreatLakes, SKINDIVER, Nov. 1996,150, 150 (hypothesizing how the introduction of exotic species will affect
local species by feeding on a common food supply, such as phytoplankton or zooplankton).
49. See Perlman, supra note 2, at Al (describing the serious disruption to the ecology of estuarine waters
brought on by the introduction of the alien Green Crab who preys upon local shellfish).
50. See Stein, supra note 2, at 1 (reporting that devastation of ecosystems by the introduction of exotic
species creates monocultures in which only one type of plant or animal flourishes).
51. See Hart, supranote 6, at 81-82 (explaining how scientists have been able to trace the introduction of
Zebra Mussels into the Great Lakes to one ship, although unnamed).
52. See The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Act of 1990: Hearings on S.2244 Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 101st. Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Baucus), 5-6 (statement of Sen. Kohl) [hereinafter Hearings on S.2244] (expressing the
expectation that the Zebra Mussel will extend through American river systems); see also Hart,supra note 6, at 87
(postulating that the zebra-mussel will enter the Mississippi river and spread down its path).

282
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Because harbors exist worldwide, through expansion of international trade, this
problem has become global in its effects. 53 Introductions of exotic species have been
5
56
55
4
reported in the United States, Australia, Europe, and Latin America. 1
Specifically, England has a long list of exotic invaders now in their harbors, and

inland waterways."
B. The Effects of the Problem
The importation of exotic species not only changes the ecology of the harbor,59
but can have severe economic ramifications. 60 Aquatic invertebrates alone are
estimated to have a negative impact of over US$1.2 billion. 6t The primary sources

53. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (detailing the international effects of exotic species
introduction).
54. See Reichert, supra note 1, at 19 (detailing the exotic species introduced in the United States).
55. See Zebra Mussels and Exotic Species: Hearings on H.R. 4214 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography
and Great Lakes, the Subcomm. On Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, and the Subcomm.
on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st. Cong., 2nd Sess.
93-94 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4214] (statement of Capt. Thomas E. Thompson, U.S. Coast Guard)
(describing infestations of Japanese shrimp, goby fish, mussels, European shore crabs, and toxic dinoflagellates in
Australian waters).
56. See id. (putting forth the statement of James T. Carlton, Maritime Studies Program, Williams College,
discussing recent infestation in the Black Sea of an organism similar to the Atlantic jellyfish, and the statement of
James T. Carlton, Maritime Studies Program, Williams College reporting appearance of planktonic organisms that
have discolored Norwegian waters).
57. See id. (presenting the statement of James T. Carlton, Maritime Studies Program, Williams College
noting presence of Chilean fjords of small planktonic crustaceans (copeopods) native to Japan).
58. See NickNuttal, Invasion ofthe alien crabs,TIMES, Oct. 18, 1997, at Features (documenting the various
invaders of England). "Britain's invaders include the Chinese mitten crab, a native of eastern Asia; a coastal cord
grass from America, which has become prolific after crossing with a native grass and is expensive to control; and
a giant, volcano-shaped barnacle from the tropics that fouls ships and strips paint off supertankers." Id. "Others
include species of phytoplankton, tiny marine organisms that can form toxic blooms around the coast, suffocating
fish and poisoning shellfish." Id. "They have been traced to the Indian and Pacific oceans and the China Seas." I.
"The leathery sea squirt, Styela clava, has spread rapidly to places such as Milford Haven in west Wales and across
to Ireland since arriving in Plymouth waters in 1952." Id. "It
was transported here on the hulls of warships after the
Korean War." Id. "It fouls ships' hulls and suffocates native oyster beds. Jenkin's spire shell, a mollusc, was
brought in drinking water barrels from Australia into the Thames estuary in the late 19th century and has spread
across rivers and canals, where it can devour native watercress." Id. "Elminius modestus, a crustacean from
Australia, was brought here possibly in ballast water and on the hulls of ships or flying boats." id. "It was first
detected in Chichester harbor, West Sussex, in 1945." Id. "The species has spread, and its larval stage is thought
to beat native organisms in competition for space on river beds." Id.
59. See Perlman, supranote 2, at Al (describing the serious disruption to the ecology of estuarine waters
brought on by the introduction of the alien Green Crab who preys on local shellfish); see also Stein, supra note 2,
at I (reporting that devastation of ecosystems by the introduction of exotic species creates monocultures in which
only one type of plant or animal flourishes).
60. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 34, at 382 (discussing the overall negative financial impact of
aquatic invertebrates).
61. See generallyOFFcEoPTEcHNOLOGYAsSEssMENTHARMFULNoNNDIGFNOusSPECISINTHEUNrED
STATES 69 (1993) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT] (estimating the actual negative impact of aquatic
invertebrates).
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of damage are physical damages done to property, 62 and the depletion of marine life
63
depended on by the fishing industry.
One of the foremost examples of the physical destruction of property is the

introduction of the Zebra Mussel into the Great Lakes. 4 It is estimated that this will
cause US$5 billion in damage by the year 2000.65 A primary English example is the
recent introduction of a tube worm from Japan, which impacted the English
shipping industry by adhering to the hulls of ships.6
The introduction of exotic species also has severe impacts on the fishing
industries. 67 The sea lamprey, a non-indigenous fish predator introduced to the
Great Lakes, requires US$10 million annually in control efforts and related fish

stocking costs. 68 North America has introduced a dangerously prolific comb jelly,
which by consuming a large amount of the local plankton supply, has starved the
Black Sea anchovy population. 69 Furthermore, the exotic American slipper limpet

has formed huge chains off French coasts, where it interferes with commercial
scallop beds.70
Therefore, many people suffer the effects of exotic species introduction."
Property owners near waterfronts and ship owners face property destruction.72

Additionally, because marine resources are common property," the entire public
suffers from exotic species introduction because of a depleted fish supply.74

Specifically, those who are dependent on the ocean's resources for their
living-commercial fishermen, associated support industries, and other water-

62. See generally Ross, supra note 3, at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost
the United States US$5 billion by 2000).
63. See generally TEcHNoLoGy ASSESSMENT, supranote 61, at 57 (detailing the predatory effects of exotic
species introduction specifically referring to a study of the sea lamprey).
64. See Ross, supra note 3, at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost the United
States US$5 billion by 2000).
65. Id.
66. See Nuttal, supra note 58, at Features (detailing the cost to mariners of the tube worm sticking to boats
and harbor installations in places such as Southhampton waters).
67. See Jarman,supranote 10, at 604 (describing the adverse affect of pollution on the fishing industry and
the possible remedies available in the United States).
68. See TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 61, at 57 (discussing the overall effect of the introduction
of the exotic sea lamprey and its related costs).
69. See Labi, supranote 42, at 64 (detailing the effect of exotic species upon the fishing industry).
70. Id.
71. See generally Ross, supranote 3, at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost
the United States US$5 billion by 2000); see generallyTEC-NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supranote 61. at 57 (detailing
the predatory effects of exotic species introduction specifically referring to a study of the sea lamprey).
72. See generally Ross, supranote 3, at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost
the United States US$5 billion by 2000).
73. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (4th ed. 1968) (defining "common property" as property owned
by the public and held by the government to be managed for the benefit of the public as a whole).
74. See generallyTEcHNOLOGY ASsEsSMENT,supra note 61, at 57 (detailing the predatory effects of exotic
species introduction specifically referring to a study of the-sea lamprey).
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dependent enterprises-suffer most acutely with the impact directly affecting their

livelihoods.

5

C. The Advantages of a Suit Brought by a Private Party

The prevention of marine pollution is addressed by a number of international

rules and standards.7 6 Notwithstanding these international rules and standards

pertaining to marine pollution, countries are motivated to maintain 'enforcement
through their own municipal jurisdictions." Moreover, Article 210 (6) of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) states national laws, regulations and

measures shall be "no less effective" in the prevention, reduction, or controlling of
marine pollution.7 8 Some authorities in fact believe private party suits offer a better
method and protection of industries.7 9 Despite these international regulations, and
statutes addressing ballast use in England, it is likely that nuisance law offers a
better method of enforcement and protection of industries. 0
Ill. ExoTic SPECIES LIABILITY IN ENGLAND
The common law nuisance suit may take one of two forms, public81 or private

nuisance.8- A successful nuisance suit requires an infringement of a right.83
Specifically, the right can be infringed by destroying property or by damaging
fishing ability.84 However, for analysis purposes this Comment will concern itself

75. See Jarman,supranote 10, at 604 (describing the adverse affect of pollution on fishing industry and the
possible remedies available in the United States).
76. See generallyTIMAGENISsupra note 8 (providing abroad overview of international attempts at pollution
regulation).
77. See SAYED HASSAN AMIN, PH.D., MARINE POLLUTION ININTERNATIONAL AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW
22 (1986) (describing state tendency to utilize municipal regulation of marine pollution, specifically addressing
Middle Eastern states).
78. See id. at 22 (quoting 19 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (1980), pp. 1131-1252 to evidence the
functionality of national law in marine pollution, based on the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea).
79. See NEWSOM & SHERRATr, supra note 16, at I (claiming that civil remedies are the most efficient
method of environmental protection in a pollution context); see also id. at vi (touting the importance of the private
civil action in the protection of waterways in England).
80. See NEWSOM & SHERRATr, supranote 16, at 1 (claiming that civil remedies are the most efficient
method of environmental protection in a pollution context); see also id. at vi (touting the importance of the private
civil action in the protection of waterways in England).
81. See infra notes 273-95 and accompanying text (defining the characteristics of a public nuisance suit).
82. See infra notes 138-272 and accompanying text (defining the private nuisance suit).
83. See Lowe v. South Somerset Dist. Council, CO/235/97, (Transcript: Smith Bernal) (Q.B. 1997) (citing
CLERK AND LINSELL ON TORTS (17th ed.) as authority for the meaning of common law nuisance); see also Hunter
v. Canary Wharf Ltd., 2 All E.R. 426,2 W.L.R. 684.2 F.L.R. 342,54 Con L.R. 12, 141 S.J.L.B. 108 (H.L. 1997)
(defining private nuisance as interference with land or the enjoyment of land).
84. See infra notes 89-109 and accompanying text (discussing the right to fish in England).
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primarily with fishing ability.85 Therefore, in order to enable the English fishing
industry to bring a suit in nuisance, it is necessary that a fishing right exist.86

This fishing right must exist in the inland waterways. Although England is surrounded by seawater, inland waterways are of primary concern because of their
prominence in the fishing industry. 7 Because of the mobility of exotic species and
other factors such as tidal diffusion, exotic species from ballast water will have
significant effect on the inland waterways of England.8
A. Right to Fish
A right to fish in England does exist.8 9 It takes form in corporeal and incorporeal fisheries, and may be vested in the entire public or a private individual. 9°

Any individual with such a fishery9' right can maintain a cause of action for the dis-

turbance of their fishery if they meet the further requirements of a public or private
nuisance. 92
The general rule regarding fisheries 93 in England is that they are in their nature
merely profits of the soil over which the water flows, and the title to the fishery
arises from the title to the soil.94 The fishery, or the right to fish, may be severed

85. Ud.
86. Id.
87. See generally NEWSOM & SHERRATr, supra note 16, at v (emphasizing the importance of inland
waterways in England, and the concern over their protection).
88. SeeJoHN H. BATES, UNITED KINGDOM MARINEPOLLUTION LAW 160 (1985) (examining the movement
of materials through the waterways of England); see also Hearings on S. 2244, supra note 52 (statement of Sen.
Baucus), 5-6 (statement of Sen. Kohl) (expressing the expectation that the Zebra Mussel will extend through
American river systems); see also Hart, supra note 6, at 87 (postulating that the zebra mussel will enter the
Mississippi river and spread down its path).
89. See infra notes 89-109 and accompanying text (discussing the right to fish in England).
90. See A-G v. Emerson [1891] A.C. 649, 656, H.L., per Lord Hersehell (distinguishing between the two
kinds of fishing); see also 18 LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 601 (4th
ed. 1977) [hereinafter 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND] (stating the law regarding the common law right to
fisheries).
91. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "fishery" as a right or liberty of taking
fish at a particular place or waters).
92. See generally 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OFENGLAND,supranote 90, § 649 (discussing the ownership rights
in the fisheries); see also id. (quoting Fraser v. Fear (1912) 107 L.T. 423, C.A. (on appeal (1914) 137 L.T. Jo 314,
H.L.), as explained in Nicholls v. Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd. [1936] Ch. 343, C.A., Stevens v. Chowin [1901] 1
Ch. 894, and Rawson v. Peters (1972) 116 Sol. Jo. 884, C.A., to demonstrate that a lessee of a fishery can maintain
a cause of action for an injunction to restrain a disturbance of his fishery even when the acts done are offences for
which penalties are designed in statutes and even without proof of damage, unless the statute forbids that remedy).
93. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "fishery" as a right or liberty of taking
fish at a particular place or waters).
94. See A-G for British Colombia v. A-G for Canada [1914] A.C. 153, 167, P.C. (describing the nature of
fishing rights and the legislative authority of a province to grant them); see generally 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND, supra note 90, § 601 n.1 (stating the law, and providing case history regarding the common law right
to fisheries).
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from the right to the soil. Therefore, two types of interests in fisheries exist. 95 The
first type, a "corporeal fishery" is used to describe a corporeal hereditament. 96 In
tidal waters, a corporeal hereditament is a several fishery97 coupled with the soil
under it, and in non-tidal waters a corporeal hereditament is the soil coupled with
a right of fishing over it.98 In contrast, the second type of interest, called an

"incorporeal fishery," is a incorporeal hereditament, which is a mere right to take
fish or a special type of fish in a defined area of water without interference with the
soil. 99

A fishery can be vested in the entire public, in which case it can be termed a
public fishery.1l° At common law, the public has a right to fish within the tidal

reaches of all rivers and estuaries, and in the sea and arms of the sea within the
limits of the territorial waters of the kingdom.' 0' However, the public cannot acquire

any general rights to fish in tidal waters which have once been the subject of a
several fishery, 1°2 in non-tidal waters, 0 3 or any rights in the foreshore.1 4

95. See A-G v. Emerson [1891] A.C. 649, 656, H.L., per Lord Herschell (distinguishing between the two
kinds of fishing); see also 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF]ENGLAND, supra note 90, § 601 (stating the law regarding the
common law right to fisheries).
96. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 726 (6th. ed. 1990) (defining "corporeal hereditaments" as substantial
permanent objects which may be inherited, including land).
97. See 18 HALSBURY's LAws oFENGLANDsupra note 90, § 617 (defining a several fishery as an exclusive
right to fishing in a given place, either with or without the property in the soil).
98. See A-G v. Emerson [1891] A.C. 649, 656, H.L., per Lord Herschell (distinguishing between the two
kinds of fishing); see also 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OFENGLAND, supranote 90, § 601 (stating the law regarding the
common law right to fisheries).
99. See A-G v. Emerson [1891] A.C. 649,656. H.L. (distinguishing between the two kinds of fishing); see
also 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OFENGLAND. supranote 90, § 601 (stating the law regarding the common law right to
fisheries).
100. See 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 90, § 602 (stating the law, and providing case
history regarding the common law right to fisheries).
101. See id. § 602 n.1 (defining the public fishing rights in the territorial tidal waters); see also id. § 612 n.2
(quoting Lowe v. Govett [1832] 3 B & Ad, and A-G v. Chambers [1854] 4 De GM & G 206, to demonstrate that
regardless of how the public acquires rights in tidal waters, the extent of the right is the mean water mark or
ordinary tides); see also id. § 612 n.3 (quoting Hale's de Jure Maris (HARGRAVE'S LAW TRACMS 12), and
Malcomson v. O'Dea [1863] 10 H.L. Cas 593, to show that the public may only acquire so far up rivers as the tide
in the ordinary course of things flows and reflows).
102. See Smith v. Andrews [1891] 2 Ch. 678 (holding that the public cannot by prescription or otherwise
obtain a legal right to fish in a non-tidal river that happened to be a severy fishery); see also Blount v. Layard
(1888) [1891] 2 Ch. 681 n.690, C.A., per Bowen U (holding no public right to in a non-tidal river, which was a
several fishery). See generally 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 90, § 611 n.2 (describing public
acquisition of fishing rights).
103. See Smith v. Andrews [1891] 2 Ch. 678 (holding that the public cannot by prescription or otherwise
obtain a legal right to fish in a non-tidal river, that happened to be a severy fishery); see also Blount v. Layard
(1888) [1891] 2 Ch. 681 n.690, C.A., per Bowen U. (holding no public right to in a non-tidal river, which was a
several fishery). See generally 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 90, § 611 n.2 (describing public
acquisition of fishing rights).
104. See Brinckman v. Matley [1904] 2 Ch. 313, C.A. (holding that the public has no right to use the
foreshore or to pass thereon for the purpose of bathing at sea); see also 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OFENGLAND, supra
note 90, § 614 (discussing generally the rights of the public to use the shore and banks).
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There also exists a private right to fish.10 5 If it is invested in one or more
individuals it is called a private fishery, where it may exist as either a several or a
common fishery.' °6 A several fishery is an exclusive right to fish in a given place,
either with or without the property in the soil.'07 A common fishery exists when a
person has a right to fish in another person's waters in common with certain other
persons.0 8 Therefore, the necessary right to fish does exist for purposes of a
nuisance suit.'09
B. Analysis under Nuisance Law
English nuisance law is based on the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non
11
laedas.
The essence of nuisance is a condition or activity which unduly interferes
with the use or enjoyment of land."' Commonly stenches, smoke and a variety of
different things are thought to amount to a nuisance, however whether they are in
fact actionable as the tort of nuisance depends upon a variety of considerations and
balancing of conflicting interests.11 Nuisance is defined as an act or omission which
interferes with, disturbs or annoys a person in the exercise or enjoyment of (1) a
right belonging to him as a member of the public, when it is a public nuisance, (2)

105. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (defining the forms of private right to fish).
106. See 18 HALSBURY's LAWS OFENGLAND, supranote 90, § 602 (stating the law and providing case history
regarding the common law right to fisheries).
107. See Hanbury v. Jenkins [1901) 2 Ch. 401,411 (holding that a "several fishery" means an exclusive right
to fish, which may exist either apart from or as incident to the ownership of the soil over which the river flows);
see also 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 90, § 617 (discussing the private rights in the several
fisheries).
108. See 18 HALSBuRY'S LAws OF ENGLAND, supra note 90, § 617 (discussing the private rights in the
common fisheries and quoting WOOLRYCH'S LAW OF WATERS (2nd ed.) 127, and 2 BI Corn (14th ed.) 34 as
authority).
109. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (defining the forms of the private right to fish).

110. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" as
"one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another"); see also William Aldred's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611) (rejecting defendant's claim that the offending hog sty was "necessary for the
sustenance of man," in favor of an absolute liability rule). See generally Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American
Law of Nuisance: Past,Present,and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 196 n.30 (1990) (explaining the sic utere rule
as a strong absolute liability standard).

111. See Lowe v. South Somerset Dist. Council, CO/235/97, (Transcript: Smith Bernal) (Q.B. 1997) (citing
CLERK AND LIN SE.L ON TORTS (17th ed.) as authority for the meaning of common law nuisance); see also Hunter
v. Canary Wharf Ltd., 2 All E.R. 426,2 W.L.R. 684, 2 EL.R. 342,54 Con L.R. 12, 141 S.J.L.B. 108 (H.L. 1997)
(defining private nuisance as interference with land or the enjoyment of land).
112. See Lowe v. South Somerset Dist. Council, CO/235/97, (Transcript: Smith Bemal) (Q.B. 1997) (citing
CLERK AND LINSELL ON TORTS (17th ed.) as authority for the meaning of common law nuisance); see also Hunter
v. Canary Wharf Ltd., 2 All E.R. 426,2 W.L.R. 684,2 F.L.R. 342,54 Con L.R. 12, 141 SJ.L.B. 108 (H.L. 1997)

(defining private nuisance as interference with land or the, enjoyment of land).
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his ownership or occupation of land or of some easement, profit, ort1 other
right used
3
or enjoyed in connection with land, when it is a private nuisance'

Whether classified as a public or private nuisance a different legal conclusion
and analysis are required.11 4 Therefore, the common issue of causation" 5 will be discussed, followed by an analysis of private" 6 and public"' nuisance, and possible
defenses."'
1. Causation

Environmental claims often raise complex issues of causation, and are expensive to litigate." 9 There are a number of obstacles a plaintiff will face in proving

causation in an exotic species introduction suit. 20 Judges may refuse enforcement
by requiring crystal clear proof of causation.'' Other courts may further require
expert testimony on critical questions, which raises the costs of litigation making
causation a crucial element.'22 Aside from these practical limitations the plaintiff
must also prove foreseeability'2 and actual causation.' 24

Under Wagon Mound III,
the court found that foreseeability of consequences
applies to nuisance suits.'2 Therefore, the general rule of causation under English

113. See Lowe v. South Somerset Dist. Council, CO/235/97, (Transcript: Smith Bernal) (Q.B. 1997) (citing
CLERK AND LINSELL ONTORTS (17th ed.) as authority for the meaning of common law nuisance); see also Hunter
v. Canary Wharf Ltd., 2 All E.R. 426,2 W.L.R. 684,2 RL.R. 342,54 Con L.R. 12, 141 S.J.L.B. 108 (H.L. 1997)
(defining private nuisance as interference with land or the enjoyment of land).
114. See infra notes 138-272 and accompanying text (defining the private nuisance suit); see also infra notes
274-96 and accompanying text (defining the public nuisance suit).
115. See infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing causation in a potential exotic species
introduction suit).
116. See infra notes 138-272 and accompanying text (defining the private nuisance suit).
117. See infra notes 273-95 and accompanying text (defining the public nuisance suit).
118. See infra notes 296-312 and accompanying text (evaluating defenses that may be raised in a exotic
species nuisance suit).
119. See Edward Brunet, Debunking Wholesale Private Enforcement of Environmental Rights, 15 HARv. J.
OFL. & PUB.POL'Y 311, 313-23 (1992) (illustrating the difficulties of proving causation in environmental cases).
120. See supranotes 119-37 and accompanying text.
121. See Brunet,supranote 119. at 313-23 (illustrating the difficulties of proving causation in environmental
cases).

122. Id.
123. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text (discussing foreseeability under Wagon Mound (No. 2)).
124. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text (analyzing actual causation in an exotic species nuisance
suit).
125. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Miller SS Co Pty, The Wagon Mound (No.2) [1967] 1 A.C. 617, 636,
[1966] 2 All E.R. 709,714, P.C.
126. See Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Miller SS Co Pty, The Wagon Mound (No.2) [1967] 1 A.C. 617,
636, [1966] 2 All E.R. 709,714, P.C. (asserting the application of foreseeability for causation purposes in nuisance
suits); see also H. Marlow Green, Comment, Common Law, PropertyRights and the Environment:A Comparative
Analysis of HistoricalDevelopments on the United States andEngland and a Modelfor the Future,30 CORNELL
INT'LLJ. 541,569 (1997) (arguing that there is arguably a distinction between nuisance suits seeking damages and
those seeking an injunction). It has been proposed that Lord Goff in Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties
Leather Plc. (2 W.L.R. 53 (H.L. 1994), found that strict liability was still the rule in an injunction setting. Id. Goff

289
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law is that the damage must be such a kind as the reasonable man should have

foreseen.' 27 The facts of Wagon Mound II involved the vessel Wagon Mound taking
oil from a wharf, when due to the carelessness of the engineers, a large quantity of

oil overflowed onto the surface of the water and drifted to the plaintiff's vessels
where it caught fire causing extensive damage to the vessels. 2 ' Nuisance was29found
based on the defendants acts which took place on their ship in the harbor.'

It may be difficult to prove a reasonable man could foresee damage caused by0

13
exotic species because of the low probability of a substantial effect taking place.

Yet, because the court in Wagon Mound II found the fire to be foreseeable despite
the low chances of igniting the oil, it is completely feasible that the similarly
improbable harm done by exotic species is equally foreseeable. Therefore, it is
likely the foreseeability requirement will be satisfied.

The question of actual causation of the exotic infestation becomes a scientific
burden, because, in most cases, there is a time lag between the introduction of the
exotic species to the ecosystem and the effect on the fishing industry or destruction

of property.13 1 Resultingly, by the time the effect is felt, it may be impossible to
trace the cause. 3 2 However, as scientific methods progress, this burden may be

lightened for two reasons.

33 First,

the continuing scientific investigation of exotic

34
species will reveal the processes that facilitate exotic species proliferation.'
Second, the greater the scientific scrutiny is focused on harbor marine ecosystems
and their changes, the sooner introductions will be identified and their effects
traced. 35 Consequently, although the fishing industry's ability to prove causation

is currently
limited, with time and scientific progress causation will eventually be
36
proved.

reasoned that it follows that cases where injunctions are claimed provide no guidance on the question of whether
foreseeability of harm of the relevant type is a prerequisite of the recovery of damages. Id.
127. See Overseas Tankership (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. the Wagon Mound, Privy
Council [1961] A.C. 388, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126, 105 SJ. 85, [1961] 1 All E.R. 404, [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1
(establishing the rule of foreseeability in place of the Polemis rule of directness for causation).
128. See Overseas Tankership (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. the Wagon Mound, Privy
Council [1961] A.C. 388, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126, 105 S.J. 85, [1961] 1 All E.R. 404, [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1
(providing the facts of the case).
129. Id.
130. See Ballast Water Management Act, H.R. REP. No. 103-440, at 3 (1994) (reporting that most exotic
species do not survive upon introduction into a new environment).
131. See David Yount, The Eco-Invaders, EPA J.,Nov.-Dec. 1990,51,51 (demonstrating that environmental
problems take time for their effects to be felt).
132. Id.
133. See generally Larsen, supranote 4, at 58 (providing a cursory discussion of causation in U.S. nuisance
suits).
134. See id (establishing why scientific progress will ease the causation burden).
135. Id
136. See generally Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Unraveling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U. BALT.
J.ENVTL. L. 1 (1993) (providing an excellent discussion of the current state of toxic tort causation, which the author
finds analogous to the introduction of exotic species).
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Therefore, the shipping industry37must concern itself with the exotic species suit
that looms in the scientific future.
2. PrivateNuisance
In contrast to a public nuisance, the defendant's conduct is not necessarily
something unlawful in a private nuisance. 138 Rather, a private nuisance may be, and
usually is, caused by a person doing, on his own land, something which he is law-

fully entitled to do.' 39 The private nuisance is not limited to acts that affect a
person's use or enjoyment of the land, but also extends to rights connected with the
land,"4 including protection against invisible invasions such as undue discomfort. 4 '
There are three general types of private nuisance.' 42 Conduct becomes a nuisance

when the consequences of the defendant's act extends to the land of his neighbor
by (1) causing an encroachment on the defendant's neighbor's land, closely
resembling trespass, (2) causing physical damage to his neighbor's land, building,

works, or vegetation upon it, or (3) unduly interfering
with his neighbor's
43

comfortable and convenient enjoyment of his land.
In determining the viability of a private nuisance suit, it is initially necessary
to establish whether the fishing industry has a cause of action against the owner of

a ship.'" Once a cause of action is established, it is necessary to determine what
standard of damages will be required, 45 and upon such proof, whether exotic
species are a natural or non-natural use, 14 6 followed by an analysis under each

classification. 47

137. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text (discussing causation in a potential exotic species
introduction suit).
138. See CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORTS 18-05 (Margaret R. Brazier et al. eds., Sweet and Maxwell 17th
ed. 1995) (providing a synopsis of the law of private nuisance).
139. Id.
140. See 34 LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 307 (4th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter 34 HALsBuRY's LAWS OFENGLAND] (stating that the private nuisances are extended to rights connected
with the land).
141. SeeTONYWEiR, ACASEBOOKONTORT 343 (5th ed., 1983) (providing discussion ofprotections offered
by private nuisance in English law).
142. see CLERK &LINDSELLONTORTs, supra note 138, at 18-05; see also Laws v. Florinplace [1981] 1 All.
E.R. 659 (dealing with a sex shop as a nuisance in a residential area).
143. See CLERK & LINDSELLON TORTS, supra note 138, at 18-05; see also Laws v. Florinplace [1981] 1 All.
E.R. 659 (dealing with a sex shop as a nuisance in a residential area).
144. See infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text (evaluating whether the fishing industry has a cause of
action).
145. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text (discussing the requisite standard for damages).
146. See infranotes 176-92 and accompanying text (considering whether exotic species are a natural or nonnatural use).
147. See infra notes 176-272 and accompanying text (analyzing an exotic species nuisance suit in the event
they are classified a natural or non-natural use).
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a. Does the FishingIndustry Have a Cause of Action

To bring a suit in private nuisance a person must be in possession or
occupation of the land affected, 4 ' and have the legal right of occupation.' 49 This
includes a suit for the disturbance of an incorporeal right. The interference will be

actionable if it51is substantial,' 50 which mandates interference with the reasonable use
of that right.

English courts have generally recognized that the fishing industry has a cause

of action against parties who disturb the industry marine life. 152 For example, where

the owner of an exclusive right of fishing in a particular place finds that the fish are
being driven away or destroyed by the act of a person in fouling or disturbing the

water, he may bring an action against the wrongdoer. 53 Therefore, it is likely that
the fishing industry will have a cause of action for such disturbance due to exotic

species introduction. 54
The general rule of nuisance liability is that anyone who creates, causes, con-

tinues, adopts, or who authorizes its creation or continuance will be liable.'55
Because private nuisance suits generally arise from a nuisance emanating from
the defendant's land, there is a question as to whether the fishing industry could

148. See Inchbold v. Robinson [1869] L.R. 4 Ch. 388 (involving a yearly tenant); see also Jones v. Chappell
[1875] L.R. 20 Eq. 539 (involving a weekly tenant); see also Foster v. Warblington U.D.C. [1906] 1 K.B. 648
(finding that de facto possession is enough); see also Tate & Lyle v. G.L.C. [1983] 2 A.C. 509 (finding that though
the claim succeeded for public nuisance, it failed as a private nuisance because it did not affect the plaintiff's
riparian rights.
149. See 34 HALsBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND, supra note 140, § 361 (outlining the requirements of an
occupier to bring suit).
150. See Celesteel Ltd. v. Alton House Holdings [1985] 1 W.L.R. 204, per Scott J. at 216 (granting an
injunction for protection of an equitable easement).
151. Id.
152. See Truro Corp. v. Rowe [1902] 2 KB 709, C.A. (holding that the mere depositing of oysters where the
public has a right of fishing does not suffice to give the depositor a right of action). See generally Foster v.
Warblington UDC [1906] 1 KB 648, C.A. (holding that an occupier of oyster beds within the limits of a several
fishery has a cause of action against polluters of the beds).
153. See Rawson v. Peters [1973] 225 EG 89, [1972] 116 SJ. 884, C.A. (holding that the mere passage of
a canoe through fishery waters was enough to be actionable, even though no fishing was taking place at the time);
see generally CLERK & LiNDSELL, supra note 138, at 18-44 n.69 (discussing the viability of incorporeal
hereditament owner to sue for disturbance of right).
154. See supranotes 152-53 and accompanying text (recognizing a cause of action in the context of marine
life disturbance).
155. See 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 140, § 364 (outlining the general rules of liability
for a private nuisance). A person is liable for causing or continuing a nuisance when he is guilty of an act of
omission which directly gives rise to the nuisance. Id. at n.4. He is further liable when he authorizes such an act
of omission. Id. at n.5. He is also liable when inadvertently he does or authorizes an act from which a nuisance
arises as a natural and probable consequence. Id. at n.6. Finally he is liable when, as an owner or occupier of
property, grants a license or gives and order to another to do acts upon it which are likely to cause a nuisance, and
both the persons ordering and committing the acts are guilty of nuisance. Id. at n.7.
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bring an exotic species introduction suit against a ship.156 However, there is no
reason why a defendant who misuses public water should
not be liable for the
1 57
creation of a nuisance as would an adjoining landowner.
In Wagon Mound II, the vessel Wagon Mound was taking on oil from a wharf,
when due to the carelessness of the engineers a large quantity of oil overflowed
onto the surface of the water and drifted to the plaintiff's vessels where it caught
fire causing extensive damage to the vessels.1 5 Nuisance was therefore found in
accordance with acts taking place on a ship in the harbor. 59 The release of exotic
species by a ship is equivalent to the release of the oil in Wagon Mound II. First,
both cases involve the spillage of potentially dangerous substances into the water.' 6
Secondly, the substances come from a ship in a harbor. 161 Moreover, both ships are
likely docked during the actual spillage.' 62 Therefore the exotic species from
a ship
63
damaging private land or interests can give rise to an action for nuisance.
Therefore, it appears that a fishery generally has the ability to bring a private
nuisance suit against the owner of a ship.
b. Requisite Standardfor Damages
The standard for damages that must be proved differs for the three categories
of private nuisance1 64 In nuisances of the first kind, liability exists because of the
encroachment. 65 No actual financial or physical damages must be proved, rather
they are presumed in the case of encroachment.' 66
In nuisances of the second kind, liability for the nuisance is established by
proving damage to the land. 67 Actual damages are essential to the cause of action,

156. See BATES, supra note 88, at 66 (discussing the application of nuisance law to ships, and the nuisance
suit's general basis in land actions).
157. See Esso Petroleum Ltd. v. Southport Corp. [1956] A.C. 224 (stating that the rationale of the private
nuisance suit should apply to nuisances arising from water rather than land).
158. See Overseas Tankership (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. the Wagon Mound, Privy
Council (1961] A.C. 388, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126, 105 S.J. 85, [1961] 1 All E.R. 404, [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. I
(detailing the facts of the case).
159. Id.
160. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supranote 34, at 381-82 (describing the history and current methods ofballast
use in harbors).

161. lId
162. Id
163. See BATES, supra note 88, at 66 (concluding that a ship responsible for oil pollution would be subject
to a private nuisance suit).
164. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (listing the damage standard required for the three
categories of private nuisance).
165. See CLERK & LINSELL, supra note 138, at 18-21 (setting forth the damage requirements for the various
forms of nuisance).
166. l
167. See id. at 18-20 (discussing the necessity for damages in nuisance suits).
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1 68
for until damage occurs, only the potentiality of a nuisance1 exists.
Therefore,
69
kind.
second
the
of
nuisances
damages must be proved under
In nuisances of the third kind, there is no absolute standard for damages to be
applied to anyone unduly interfering with use and enjoyment of the land. 7 °
Although no precise test has been formulated, a useful test is what is reasonable
according to ordinary usages of mankind living in a particular society.""
To determine what kind of damages must be proven by the English fishing
industry in an exotic species introduction suit, it is useful to look to prior case law
for guidance. In the context of an action for the disturbance of a fishery, English
courts have found the object of such an action is to vindicate a right of property, and
it is only necessary to prove a person's right has been infringed, without proving
actual damages.172 The first category of nuisance suits is the only one not requiring
damages because they are presumed. 73 Therefore, an exotic species introduction
suit for the disturbance of a fishery would fall under the first category, thus
presuming damages.
In contrast to an action for disturbance of a fishery, courts have determined that
1 74
in an action for the disturbance of riparian rights, actual damages are required.
The second category of nuisances is the only one of the three to affirmatively
require actual damages. Therefore, an exotic species introduction suit for the
disturbance of riparian rights will fall under category two and require actual
damages.
Conversely, neither the disturbance of riparian or fishery rights seem to fall
primarily on the senses or nerves of the owners.7 Therefore, neither fall under the
third category for damages.

168. Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callaghan [1940] A.C. 880, 896, 919-20.
169. See CLxRK &LINSELL, supranote 138, at 18-20 (discussing the necessity for damages in nuisance suits).
170. See St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1865) 11 H.L.C. 642, 650 (providing the general rule of
nuisance). "[Tihe personal inconvenience and interference with one's enjoyment, one's quiet, one's personal
freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the senses or nerves." Id.
171. Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callaghan [1940] A.C. 880, per Lord Wright at 903.
172. See Nichols v. Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd [1936] 1 Ch. 343, 344 (holding that the disturbance of a
several fishery is a legal right and that it is not necessary to prove pecuniary loss, but the injury to the legal right
itself carries with it damages).
173. See CLERK & LINSELL, supra note 138, at 18-21 (explaining the damages that must be proved under first
category of nuisance).
174. See NEWsOM & SHERRATF, supra note 16, at 7-8 (describing the three circumstances controlling the
rights of the lower riparian owner).
175. See St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1865) 11 H.L.C. 642, 650 (providing the general rule of
nuisance). "[Tihe personal inconvenience and interference with one's enjoyment, one's quiet, one's personal
freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the senses or nerves." Id.
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c. Natural v. Non-Natural Use?
Once it has been demonstrated that a fishery has the ability to bring suit against
the owner of a ship, and the standard for damages is established, it is necessary to
analyze specific issues instrumental to a successful nuisance suit more closely. In
private nuisance case law, the object of the nuisance suit has been divided into two
distinct categories for analytical purposes. 7 6 The two categories are natural uses,
and non-natural uses. 77 Therefore it is necessary to determine whether the English
courts would classify exotic species as one or the other.
The House of Lords has not made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "nonnatural." However, Viscount Simon, a member of the House of Lords, in Read v .
Lyons & Co.17 stated in his opinion that Lord Moulton's analysis in Rickards v.
Lothian1 7 is of first importance. 80 Therefore, it is necessary to look to Rickards for
primary guidance in determining whether exotic species are natural or non-natural
uses.
Rickards involved a domestic water supply to a fourth floor lavatory basin
which plugged up, and overflowed.' The court ruled that the domestic water
supply was a natural use, as opposed to a non-natural use.18 2 A number of factors
were considered, however, the court utilized three primary factors to make its deter84
mination. 183 These factors are (1) the water supply was almost a necessary feature,1
(2) it was so desirable as to make it obligatory8 6in civilized society, 85 and (3) it was
impossible to guard against wilful mischief.
First, the court found the domestic water supply to be almost a necessary
feature.8 7 There exist alternatives to the use of seawater as ballast to maintain the

176. See generallyRead v. J.Lyons & Co., House of Lords [1947] A.C. 156, [1947] L.R. 39,175 L.T. 413,
62 T.L.R. 646, [1946] 2 All E.R. 71 (acknowledging the distinction between non-natural and natural classification
in a nuisance suit).
177. See infra notes 177-273 and accompanying text (providing a nuisance analysis for exotic species when
classified as either natural or non-natural).
178. Read v. J. Lyons & Co., House of Lords [1947] A.C. 156, [1947] LJ.R. 39, 175 L.T. 413, 62 T.L.R.
646, [1946] 2 All E.R. 71.
179. Rickards v. Lothian, Privy Counsel [1913] A.C. 263, 82 L.J.P.C. 42, 108 L.T. 225, 29 T.L.R. 281, 57
S.J. 281, [1911-13] All E.R.Rep. 71.
180. See Read v. J. Lyons & Co., House of Lords [1947] A.C. 156, [1947] LJ.R. 39,175 L.T.413, 62T.L.R.
646, [1946] 2 All E.R. 71 (stating that Lord Moulton's opinion in Rickards v Lothian is of first importance in future
House of Lords evaluation of the meaning of "non-natural" within Rylands).
181. See Rickards v. Lothian, Privy Counsel [1913] A.C. 263, 82 L.J.P.C. 42, 108 L.T. 225,29 T.L.R. 281,
57 SJ. 281, [1911-13] All E.R.Rep. 71 (discussing what constitutes a non-natural use in prior case law).
182. Id.
183. See id. (discussing the factors considered by the court in determining what constitutes a non-natural use).
184. Id.

185. li
186. Id.
187. Id.
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necessary draft and stability. 8' However, these alternatives are equally antiquated
and cumbersome as the alternatives to the domestic water supply. Therefore, the
current requirements of the shipping industry make seawater ballast almost a necessary feature. Second, the domestic water supply was recognized as so desirable as
to make it obligatory in civilized society.8 9 Although ballast water use has little to
do with comfort, it has much to do with expediency and efficiency in transportation
which are crucial factors in today's society. Therefore, a court would likely find that
ballast water use satisfies the second requirement of being obligatory.' ° The third
9
and final consideration is that it was impossible to guard against wilful mischief.9'
Ballast water use, however, is not impossible to guard against, as there have been
many viable options proposed to guard against exotic species introduction.192
Therefore, seawater ballast use would likely fail to meet the third consideration.
Because the court in Rickards found the satisfaction of the three considerations
to be dispositive of classification as a natural use, the failure of exotic species to
satisfy the third requirement makes it likely that English courts would determine
exotic species to be a non-natural use. However, because the House of Lords only
regarded Rickards as a guiding case, this conclusion is not based on a final standard.
Therefore, this Comment will also consider the possibility of exotic species being
classified as a natural use.
i. Liabilityfor Non-Natural Uses: Rylands v. Fletcher
Although it is possible that exotic species may be determined to be a natural
use, it is more likely that exotic species introduction will be found a non-natural
use, and liability must then be evaluated under Rylands v. Fletcher.193 Furthermore,
because exotic species are comparable to traditional pollutants, an analysis of a
potential exotic species introduction suit under prior pollution nuisance case law
will be indicative of the viability of such an exotic species introduction suit. 94

188. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 34, at 381 (describing the history and current methods of ballast
use).
189. See generally Rickards v. Lothian. Privy Counsel [1913] A.C. 263, 82 LJ.P.C. 42, 108 L.T. 225, 29
T.L.R. 281, 57 SJ. 281, [1911-13] All E.R.Rep. 71 (discussing what may be found to reasonably constitute a nonnatural use and factors).
190. See generally Dentler, supra note 28, at 196 n.30 (illustrating the use of ballast to maintain ship
efficiency).
191. See Rickards v. Lothian, Privy Counsel [1913] A.C. 263, 82 LJ.P.C. 42, 108 L.T. 225,29 T.L.R. 281,
57 SJ. 281, [1911-13] All E.R.Rep. 71 (discussing what may be found to reasonably constitute a non-natural use
and factors).
192. See Ritter,supranote 12, at 36 (examining the current proposals for elimination of exotic species, which
include stainless steel screens, chemicals, heat, electric pulses, ultraviolet light, sound waves, magnetic treatment,
and oxygen starvation).
193. Rylands v. Fletcher, House of Lords (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 37 LJ.Ex. 161, 19 L.T. 220, 33 J.P. 70.
194. See infra notes 210-53 and accompanying text.
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aa. Liability under Rylands v. Fletcher
The basic rule of law regarding non-natural uses is that any person who, for his
own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima

facie195 answerable for all damages resulting as a natural consequence of its
escape. 9 6 Thus, liability is owed to a person who is injured as a result of the
escape.19 7
Rylands v. Fletcher involved defendants who wished to improve their water

supply by constructing a reservoir.!98 In the course of construction, the engineers
hired by the defendants came across unused mine shafts and did not seal them
properly. 199 When the reservoir was filled upon completion of the project, water
flowed down the shafts and caused damage to the plaintiffs coal mine.2'o
The court identified two chief factors in Rylands' liability.201 First, the defen-

dants did not limit their actions to the natural use of the property. Rather, they
attempted to introduce to the property something which in its natural condition is

not in or upon it, and not the result of some natural process. 2 2 Second, the
defendants knew it was likely to do mischief if such non-natural materials escaped
to the neighbors. 3
Therefore, liability under Rylands is conditioned upon these two elements, the
escape of something that is likely to do mischief, and the non-natural use of the
land. 20 4 Escape means an escape from a place where the defendant has occupation
or control, to a place outside of the occupation or control. 20 5
The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher likely applies to ships that introduce exotic
species.2 Authorities believe that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher also applies to
195. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "prima facie" as "a fact presumed to be
true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary").
196. See Rylands v. Fletcher, House of Lords (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 37 LJ.Ex. 161, 19 L.T. 220, 33 J.P.
70 (stating the basic rule of law regarding the liability for escape of non-natural use).
197. Rylands v. Fletcher, House of Lords (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 37 L.J.Ex. 161, 19 L.T. 220, 33 J.P. 70;
see also 34 HALSBIRY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supranote 140, § 339 (giving explanation to the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher).

198. See Rylands v.Fletcher, House of Lords [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 37 LJ.Ex. 161, 19 L.T. 220, 33 J.P.
70 (recounting the pertinent facts of the case).
199. lId
200. Id.
201. See id (identifying principles behind the general rule, and the important factors in the factual situation).
202. Id.
203. See id. (indicating that knowledge of likelihood of doing mischief may be important in consideration
of liability).
204. See Read v. J. Lyons &Co., House of Lords [1947] A.C. 156, [1947] L.J.R. 39, 175 L.T. 413,62 T.L.R.
646, [1946] 2 All E.R. 71 (listing the necessary elements to be proved under Rylands).
205. See id (defining "escape" under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher).
206. See generallyBATES, supranote 88, at 67 (discussing the application of Rylands v. Fletcherto ships that
transport oil). But see J. MCLOUGHLIN AND MJ. FORSTER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION
CONTROL INTHE UNITED KINGDOM 25-26 (2d ed. 1982) (claiming that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcheris limited
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ships responsible for oil pollution. 20 7 Exotic species from ballast water are substantially similar to oil from a ship. Both originate from natural sources, are taken
into ships, and are accidentally released into water where they do not naturally
occur.mg Therefore, no facts distinguish exotic species introduction from oil
spillage, and the principle behind the application to oil transportation in ships
should apply equally to exotic species transportation in ships, if they are proved a
non-natural use.
bb. Analogy to liability under Pollution Liability
If exotic species are determined to be a non-natural use, they will be analogous
to traditional pollutants classified as non-natural uses .2 9 Therefore, because of this
similarity, consideration of the principles behind the pollution private nuisance suit
will be indicative of the viability of a private nuisance suit for exotic species introduction.
Under English common law, there has been substantial litigation over the
pollution of waterways, especially concerning the inland waterways which are important to fishing industries. 2t0 The rules of law that have been applied in these
pollution cases do not appear to be strictly limited to pollution. The principles
behind the rules should apply equally to the other materials such as exotic species,
because the rationale behind the rules are concerned with the rights of the property
owners rather than the nature of the pollutant.
In cases involving pollution, the courts have utilized two instrumental cases in
determining liability, Young v. Bankier Distillery Co. 211 for riparian owners, and
Nicholls v. Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd.2t2 for fishery owners.213 Within private
nuisance in the pollution context, the common law has divided the right to sue
according to these property concepts. t4 There are fundamental differences between

to nuisance coming from land).
207. See BATES,supra note 88, at 67 (discussing the application of Rylands v. Fletcherto ships that transport
oil). But see MCLoUGHL N & FORSTER, supranote 206, at 25-26 (claiming that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher is
limited to nuisance coming from land).
208. See generally O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 34, at 381 (detailing the processes involved in seawater
ballast use).
209. See generallyR. JOHNSTON, MARINE POLLUTION 53-54 (R. Johnston ed. 1976) (defining waterbome
pollution); see also iL 137-39 (detailing pollution interaction with the fishermen); see also W.R.P BOURNE,
MARINE POLLUTION 408-409 (R. Johnston ed. 1976) (listing the main types of marine pollution, specifically
addressing sea foul).
210. See generally NEWSOM & SHERRATI!, supra note 16, at v (emphasizing the importance of inland
waterways in England to fishing, and other competing uses).
211. Young v. Bankier Distillery Co. [1893] A.C. 691.
212. Nicholls v. Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd. [1936] Ch. 343.
213. See NEWSOM & SHERRATr, supra note 16, at 2 (reviewing the property rights in English streams, and
the corresponding case law).
214. Id.
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the rights of a riparian owner and a fishery ownerf The foremost difference is that
while a riparian owner can sue for any damaging change in the quantity or quality
of water, a fishery owner can sue only when the change has affected his right to
fish.21 6 Therefore, the application of these two cases to exotic species introduction
should be indicative of the success of a private nuisance suit for exotic species
introduction if they are found non-natural uses.
1) RiparianRights: Young v. Bankier
21 7
The proprietor of one or both banks of a stream is called the riparian owner.
If he is the proprietor of both banks, he generally owns the bed as well, and where
there is no evidence of a several fishery, the riparian owner has fishing rights. 8
The rights of a riparian owner in a nuisance suit are set out in Young v. Bankier
Distillery Co. 2t 9 As a general rule a riparian owner is entitled to have the water
reach him unaltered in quantity or quality, subject to ordinary and reasonable uses
by the upstream proprietors.220 Any invasion of this right causing actual damage or
possessing the possibility of ripening into an adverse right provides the riparian
owner with the right to bring suit. 22 t The rights of the riparian owner are limited to
those regarding water passing within the land. Therefore, liability against shippers
is limited to upstream actions, and does not extend to downstream action.2 2 In
contrast, fishery rights allow for liability against shippers based on upstream and
downstream action.m Therefore, under a riparian suit, a plaintiff can sue only for
exotic species released upstream, and not for exotic species released downstream,
even though the party is adversely affected by the upstream effects of the exotic
species.224
2
There are three sets of circumstances that control the rights of the owner. 5
First, the change in the water must appear within the property of riparian owner.226
Second, there must be a "sensible" alteration.2 27 Finally, whatever flows through the

215. See id. at 17 (demonstrating the difference between the riparian and fishery owner's ability to bring suit).
216. Id.
217. See id. at 2 (providing brief description of a riparian owner and his rights).
218. Id.
219. Young v. Bankier Distillery Co. [1893] A.C. 691.
220. See NEWSOM & SHERRATr, supra note 16, at 3 (basing the general rule of riparian rights on Young v.
Bankier Distillery Co. [1893] A.C. 691,698).
221. Id.
222. See generally NEWSOM & SHERRA7T, supra note 16, at 17 (maintaining that even non-migratory fish
can be affected by downstream action, such as the movement of water backwards due to the tide).
223. Id.
224. Id.

225. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
226. See NEWSOM & SHERRATr, supranote 16, at 7 (describing the first of three circumstances controlling

the rights of the lower riparian owner).
227. Id.
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owners property must either cause actual damage or where there is no damage, there
must be a possibility of the continuing action ripening into an adverse right, such
as an easement to pollute.228
Under the first circumstance, the change in the water, whether in quantity or
quality, must appear within the property of riparian owner.229 In the case of exotic
species, they must be found to pass through the plaintiff's property or water whose
quality has been sensibly changed by the presence of exotic species upstream.
Second, there must be a "sensible" alteration. 230 This has been found to mean
more than merely trivial, but it does not have to be gross or even serious."' Specifically, the exotic species must have some effect on the ecology of the waterway for
the "sensible" requirement to be met.
The third circumstance requires that whatever flows through the owners
property must either cause actual damage or where there is no damage, there must
be a possibility of the continuing action ripening into an adverse right.232 Therefore,
under the riparian suit, the exotic species must damage the quality of the stream in
some palpable manner.
Once the three controlling circumstances are in order, the owner must meet the
five following requirements to successfully bring a civil action against the defendants: (1) the riparian owner must be able to prove his title as riparian owner or
lessee; 233 (2) the owner must prove the condition of the water within his property,
but for the action of the defendant;2 (3) the owner must then show that the
defendant has interfered; 5 (4) further, the owner must prove that the water passing
within his property is now worse than it otherwise would have been; 2 6 (5) finally,
237
the owner must prove that the worsening is due to the action of the defendant.
The first requirement of title as owner or lessee should be easily met through
the presentation of the proper legal documents proving such title.
Under the second requirement, the owner must prove the condition of the water
was within his property but for the action of the defendant.238 This requirement
seems to indicate that the owner must prove that such exotic species do not
normally reside in his waters, nor did they exist prior to the defendant's action.

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See NEWSOM& SHERRATr, supra note 16, at 8 (describing the three circumstances controlling the rights
of the lower riparian owner). Giving an easement to pollute as an example of such an adverse right. Id.
233. See id at 11 (outlining the necessary steps to bring a civil action for nuisance by a riparian owner,
specifically in the context of pollution).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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Thirdly, the owner must show that the defendant has interfered. 9 Although
causation issues will prove difficult,240it will likely be feasible to prove deballasting
by the defendant.
Further, the owner must prove that the water passing within his property is now
worse than it otherwise would have been. 24t In the context of pollution, this is
accomplished by taking samples and measuring counts of materials introduced and
offering lay and expert witnesses testifying to the changes. 242 It is likely that the
same process can be applied to exotic species through physically counting the
number introduced and the use of testimony. Because the worsening must only be
greater than trivial, any markable increase would likely be sufficient.
Finally, the owner must prove that the worsening is due to the action of the
defendant.243 The nature of the introduction of exotic species via ballast water and
the complexities of the ecological mechanisms that are induced demonstrate that
causation will be difficult to prove. 244 Nevertheless, it appears that a riparian owner
could meet the first four requirements, and if causation is proven, then a riparian
owner has a viable cause of action based on exotic species introduction.
2) FisheryRights
In contrast to the rights of the riparian owner, there exists the right of the fishery
owner, which differs significantly from the riparian. 245 Although, if no fishery rights
have been given out, the riparian owner will most often possess the fishery rights
in the stream.246 The right of fishing is a proprietary interest in the fishery in a
stream, separate from the soil. 247 A loss need not be proven, only the disturbance. 248
The source for the private nuisance rule regarding the disturbance of a fishery
is Nicholls v. Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd.249 A fishery owner has a right of action
against any person when he can show that the change in the stream has affected

239. Id.
240. See supra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing causation in a potential exotic species
introduction suit).
241. See NEWSOM & SHERRATr, supra note 16, at 11 (delineating the necessary steps to bring a civil action
for nuisance by a riparian owner, specifically in the context of pollution).
242. See generally id. at 20 (reviewing the evidentiary uses of various measuring techniques).
243. See id. at 11 (outlining the necessary steps to bring a civil action for nuisance by a riparian owner,
specifically in the context of pollution).
244. See supra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing causation in a potential exotic species

introduction suit).
245. See NEWSOM& HERRA~rr,supra note 16, at 16 (describing the nature of the fishery property interest).
246. Id.
247. Id
248. See Nichols v. Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd. [1936] 1 Ch. 343 (holding that the disturbance of a several
fishery is a legal right and that it is not necessary to prove pecuniary loss, but the injury to the legal right itself
carries with it damages).
249. Id.
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prejudicially his right to fish in addition to the requirements of the riparian owner.a25
The rights of the fishery owner also differ from the riparian owner in that downstream action that has a detrimental effect on the fishing of his property is
actionable.2' Therefore, because only the ability to fish must be disturbed, it does
not matter whether the exotic species were released upstream or downstream. As
a result, it is possible that exotic species which are deballasted at the mouth of a
river can incur liability for upstream effects on fishing.
Again, as in riparian nuisance suits, evidence can be presented by anglers and
biologists as to the condition of the stream and the presence of such exotic species
and their effects, and samples taken.z 2 Assuming causation is proven, where it has
been demonstrated that exotic species introduction has prejudicially affected the
ability to fish, and that it is feasible to meet the riparian requirements, the shipping
industry is likely liable under a right of fishery cause of action.
ii. Liabilityfor Natural Uses: Leaky v. National Trust
"If, as a result of the working of forces of nature, there is, poised above my
land, or above my house, a boulder or a rotten tree, which is liable to fall at any
moment of the day or night, perhaps destroying my house, and perhaps killing or
injuring me or members of my family, am I without remedy?... Must I, in such a
case, if my protests to 53
my neighbor go unheeded, sit and wait and hope that the
''
worst will not befall? 2
A similar sentiment will apply to those who suffer the effects of exotic species
introduction if it is determined to be a natural use instead of a non-natural use.s 4
However, in England, the occupier of land might be liable to his neighbor when a
nuisance spreads from his land to his neighbors causing damage, even though the
existence and the operative effect of the nuisance was not caused by a non-natural
use by the defendant.25

250. See NEWsoM & SH-RRATr, supra note 16, at 17 (enunciating the rule of law for Fishery rights); see also
i. at I1 (outlining the necessary steps to bring a civil action for nuisance by a riparian owner, specifically in the
context of pollution).
251. See id at 17 (maintaining that even non-migratory fish can be affected by downstream action, such as
the movement of water backwards due to the tide).
252. See generally id. at 20 (providing an explanation for the evidentiary uses of various measuring

techniques).
253. See Leakey v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, Court of Appeal [1980]
Q.B. 485, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 65, [1980] 1 All E.R. 17. 78 L.G.R. (presenting a hypothetical situation clearly
illustrating need for remedy in a case of inaction rising to nuisance by Megaw Li.).
254. See supra notes 177-93 and accompanying text (evaluating whether exotic species are a natural or non-

natural use).
255. See Leakey v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, Court of Appeal [1980]
Q.B. 485, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 65, [1980] 1 All E.R. 17,78 L.G.R. 100 (stating that when a party knows of a condition
on their property, and is aware of the threat it posed, they were liable despite its natural causation).
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There are three main factors that must be considered when determining
liability: 256 (1) the party must have knowledge or should have had knowledge that

the present condition existed, and the danger it posed to his neighbors;

7

(2) the

risk;258

extent of the
and (3) it must be determined what was reasonable to prevent
the known risk to the neighbors property. 9
First, the party must have knowledge or should have had knowledge that the
present condition existed, and the danger that it posed to his neighbors .26 Therefore,
this liability only exists when the defect or condition becomes patent.2 1 In contrast,
when the defect is latent, no liability arises. 262 In the case of exotic species, there
has been substantial media documentation of their existence and the problems
created by the presence of exotic species in the ballast water of ships.263 Therefore,

it is quite clear that the shipping industry has the requisite knowledge.
Secondly, the extent of the risk must be considered. 264 The extent of risk
includes considerations of: the chances of the problem occurring; the extent of
possible damages; is it practicable to prevent; how simple or difficult the measures
to be taken are; their costs; and was there sufficient time to prevent the risk.265

Although the number of exotic species in ballast is high,26 the chances of such an
egregious effect are low.267 However, even if the chances of such effect are low, the
extent of possible damages is extremely high.268 Although some of the current
proposals for prevention have been found impracticable, some eliminate a large
percentage of the exotic species in a fairly practical manner. For example, a

256. See Leakey v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, Court of Appeal [1980]
Q.B. 485, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 65, [1980] 1 All E.R. 17, 78 L.G.R. 100 (discussing the scope of a parties duty in a
nuisance action).
257. See Leakey v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, Court of Appeal [1980]
Q.B. 485, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 65, [1980] 1 All E.R. 17, 78 L.G.R. 100 (discussing the duty for natural nuisance, and
when it arises).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 25-75 and accompanying text (providing media sources detailing the problems by exotic
species).
264. See Leakey v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, Court of Appeal [1980]
Q.B. 485, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 65, [19801 1 All E.R. 17, 78 L.G.R. 100 (discussing the scope of a party's duty in a
nuisance action).
265. Id.
266. See generally SHIPPING STUDY, supra note 26, at 40 (providing a finding of at least 367 distinct
taxonomic groups of plants and animals in ballast water from ships arriving in Oregon from Japan).
267. See H.R. REP. No. 103-440, at 3 (1994) (reporting that most exotic species do not survive upon
introduction into a new environment).
268. See generally Ross, supra note 3, at 41 (estimating that the efforts to control the zebra mussel will cost
the United States US$5 billion by 2000); see generally O'Shea & Cangelosi, supranote 34, at 382 (discussing the
overall negative financial impact of aquatic invertebrates).
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stainless steel screen has been proposed. 269 Therefore, considering the possibility

of significant reduction with the application of new technologies and the incredible
potential for damages, it is likely that the extent of the risk would weigh against the

shipping industry in a potential suit.
The third factor is that a party must do anything that is reasonable in all circum-

stances, and no more than what is reasonable to prevent the known risk to the neighbors property. 2 0 This is a subjective standard. 2 ' Specifically, financial means, age
and physical condition, logic and good sense may be relevant in a broad assessment.272 The majority of the shipping industry, would be reasonably expected to

provide precautions limiting the exotic species introduction because of their
financial ability.
Therefore, assuming causation is proven, the shipping industry could find itself
liable for exotic species introduction, even if the current ballast use involving exotic
species is determined to be a natural use.
3. PublicNuisance

A public nuisance is a criminal offense.273 However, when a private individual
has suffered particular damages over and above the general inconvenience and

injury suffered by the public, and the particular damage is direct and substantial, a
public nuisance is also actionable as a civil wrong. 274 A person commits a public
nuisance when they commit an act not warranted by law, or when they omit to
269. See generally Ritter, supra note 12, at 36 (outlining the current proposals for elimination of exotic
species, which include stainless steel screens, chemicals, heat, electric pulses, ultraviolet light, sound waves,
magnetic treatment, and oxygen starvation).
270. See Leakey v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, Court of Appeal [1980]
Q.B. 485, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 65, [1980] 1 All E.R. 17, 78 L.G.R. 100 (discussing the scope of a party's duty in a
nuisance action).
271. Id.
272. See Leakey v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, Court of Appeal [1980]
Q.B. 485, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 65, [1980] 1 All E.R. 17,78 L.G.R. 100 (listing factors in consideration of duty of the
particular man). This assessment may also apply to the person who's property is damaged, in determining capacity
to protect himself. let
273. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400, 43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R.
631 (holding that to entitle a private party to maintain a public nuisance suit, they must show he sustained a
particular damage or injury other than and beyond the general injury to the public, and that such damage is direct
and substantial); see also Fritz v. Hobson [1880] 14 Ch. 542 (allowing plaintiff to recover damages on the ground
that he has suffered a particular injury from a public nuisance); see also Vanderpant v. Mayfair Hotel Co. [19301
1 Ch. 138 (holding that a plaintiff must prove they sustained particular and substantial and direct damage beyond
the general inconvenience and injury to the public).
274. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400, 43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R.
631 (holding that to entitle a private party to maintain a public nuisance suit, they must show he sustained a
particular damage or injury other than and beyond the general injury to the public, and that such damage is direct
and substantial); see also Fritz v. Hobson [1880] 14 Ch. 542 (allowing plaintiff to recover damages on the ground
that he has suffered a particular injury from a public nuisance); see also Vanderpant v. Mayfair Hotel Co. [1930]
1 Ch. 138 (holding that a plaintiff must prove they sustained particular and substantial and direct damage beyond
the general inconvenience and injury to the public).
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discharge a legal duty, and the effect of the act or omission is to endanger the life,

health, property, morals, or comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the
exercise or enjoyment of rights common to

all.2

75

A public nuisance also exists

where it inflicts damage, injury or inconvenience on not only all the Queen's
subjects, but on all members of a class who come within the sphere or neighborhood
of its operation. 6 The determination of the number required to constitute a class
is a question of fact.2' Although a public nuisance is intended to be brought on
behalf of the public, it may be brought on behalf of an individual when they fulfill

specific requirements.

8

a. When May a PrivateIndividualBring a Public Nuisance Suit?
To bring a public nuisance suit in the name of an individual, a private plaintiff
must substantiate three different elements in addition to the existence of a mere
public nuisance.2 9 First, he must show a particular injury beyond the injury suffered
by the public at large.20 Secondly, he must demonstrate that his injury was fore-

seeable, 281 and not a mere consequential injury.282 Finally, the injury must be of
substantial character.283

275. See CLERK&LNDsELL, supranote 138, at 18-02 (quoting ARCHBOLD: CRMMINALPLEADNGEVIDENCE
AND PRACTnCE 1994, para. 31-40) (providing a definition of public nuisance).
276. 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supranote 140, § 305.
277. See A-G v. PYA Quarries Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 169, 184, [1957] 1 All E.R. 894, 902, C.A. (ruling that
a public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would
not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, but should
be taken on the responsibility of the community at large).
278. See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text (stating when a private individual may bring a public
nuisance suit).
279. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400,43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R.
631 (establishing the requirements for a public nuisance suit); see also 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra
note 140, § 370 n.3 (providing a comprehensive list of development and intricacies of substantial damages
requirement); see also Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch. 109 (suing for nuisance due to
interference with private right to access of light). In addition, a private individual may also bring a public nuisance
suit in his name when the interference with the public right involves some private right of his own. Id.
280. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P.400,43 L.LC.P. 162,30 L.T. 362,22 W.R.
631 (establishing the requirements for a public nuisance suit).
281. See Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Miller SS Co Pty, The Wagon Mound (No.2) [1967] 1 A.C. 617
at 636, [1966] 2 All E.R. 709 at 714, P.C. (holding that foreseeability of an injury is a necessary element in the
measure of damages recoverable in nuisance).
282. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400,43 LJ.C.P. 162,30 L.T. 362,22 W.R.
631 (establishing the requirements for a public nuisance suit); see also Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874]
L.R. 9 C.P. 400, 43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R. 631 (establishing the requirements for a public nuisance
suit). Furthermore, where the injury consists of one way being obstructed, if there is another left open the injury
does not fulfill the direct requirement. Id.
283. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400,43 LJ.C.P. 162,30 L.T. 362,22 W.R.
631 (establishing the requirements for a public nuisance suit).
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b. PublicNuisance under Benjamin v. Storr
The paramount case in a public nuisance suit is Benjamin v. Storr.28 The case
of Benjamin v. Storr involved a coffee-house owner who brought suit against a
defendant whose many horse-drawn vans frequented his exit which adjoined the

plaintiff's business.285 The court found the bad smell resulting from the horse-drawn
carriages, and the resulting diminution of business met the requirements of

particular, direct and substantial. 8 6
Many of the factors considered in Benjamin v. Storr are present in a potential
exotic species introduction suit. For example, the plaintiffs are similar in three
ways. First, a coffee-house and a fishery do business in set locations.8 7 Second,
they both depend upon the attractiveness of their local environment to attract

business, whether it is coffee drinkers or fish. Third, both businesses are sensitive
to alterations or interferences with these environments.2 88

The defendants are similar as well. The ships much like the carriages pass
closely by the plaintiff's business. Furthermore, both defendants create nuisances
that discourage business. One introduced a bad smell that offends customers, and
the other an exotic species that out-competes or preys upon local industry fish.289

Finally, the injury of lost business is common to both cases. Specifically, exotic
species will often do more than merely discourage business, rather, they may
29
completely eliminate the necessary fish for business. 0
However, there are factors that may distinguish the two cases. Specifically, the
defendants are different. In Benjamin v. Storr, there was only one defendant who

owned all the carriages, whereas in exotic species introduction there are a number
of ships with different owners.29 Therefore, it will be more difficult to prove which

defendant ship caused the injury in an exotic species suit.292 A further causation

284. Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400,43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R. 631
285. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400, 43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R.
631 (providing a summary of the facts of the case).
286. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400,43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362. 22 W.R.
631 (setting out factual settings that would meet the three requirements of a private person bringing a public
nuisance suit).
287. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400, 43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R.
631 (providing a summary of the facts of the case).
288. See BRIGGS, supra note 40 (presenting analysis of the worldwide distribution of marine life). See
generally CUSHING, supra note 40 (describing interaction of marine life and population dynamics); see generally
NIKOLSKY, supra note 40 (discussing the relationship between fish and their natural environment);
289. See generally TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 61, at 57 (detailing the predatory effects of exotic
species introduction specifically referring to a study of the sea lamprey).
290. See generally Labi, supra note 42, at 64 (detailing the effect of exotic species upon the fishing industry,
explaining how an anchovy population is being starved by exotic species competition).
291. See Benjamin v. Storr, Common Pleas [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 400,43 LJ.C.P. 162, 30 L.T. 362, 22 W.R.
631 (providing a summary of the facts of the case).
292. See supra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing causation in a potential exotic introduction
suit).
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complication is the ease of traceability in Benjamin v. Storr,whereas tracing the
injury in exotic species introduction poses current technological difficulties.293
However, there is one difference that favors an exotic species introduction suit-the
potential injury caused by one ship in the fishing industry is much greater than the
injury posed by one carriage passing by the coffee-house. 94
Therefore, if the facts of Benjamin v. Storr meet the three requirements of
public nuisance, a court would also find that an exotic species introduction suit,
maintained by the English fishing industry, satisfies the requirements.295
4. PossibleDefenses
There are four general defenses available in public and private nuisance. 296They
are (1) inevitable accident,297 (2) the act of a trespasser,298 (3) ignorance of
nuisance, 299 and(4
and (4) contributory negligence. 3°
The inevitable accident defense applies where the occurrence cannot be prevented by reasonable care, caution and skill.0 1 Specifically the shippers may claim
a secret and unobservable process of nature as the reason for the damage to the
fish. 3' Nevertheless, it is likely that the new methods of prevention will foreclose
this defense.30 3
Secondly, the shippers will not be able to use act of trespasser defense because
the act of ballast use is intentional, and thus not attributable to the act of a
trespasser.3 4
The ignorance of nuisance defense is that no person is liable for nuisance unless
he had knowledge or means of knowledge. 30 5 Because of the media attention given

293. IML
294. See Stein, supra note 2, at I (reporting that devastation of ecosystems by the introduction of exotic
species, thus creating monocultures in which only one time of plant or animal flourishes).
295. See supra notes 285-95 and accompanying text (outlining the public nuisance requirements of Benjamin
v. Storr).
296. See CLERK &LINDSELL, supra note 138, at 18-55 (laying out the general defenses available in nuisance

suits).
297. See id at 18-56 (delineating the inevitable accident defense).
298. See id at 18-57 (explaining the act of trespasser defense).
299. See id. at 18-59 (setting forth the ignorance of nuisance defense).
300. See id. at 18-62 (stating that contributory negligence is a defense to a nuisance action).
301. See id. at 18-56 (delineating the inevitable accident defense).
302. Id.
303. See generally Ritter, supranote 12, at 36 (outlining the current proposals for elimination of exotic
species, which include stainless steel screens, chemicals, heat, electric pulses, ultraviolet light, sound waves,
magnetic treatment, and oxygen starvation).
304. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 34, at 381 (describing the history and current methods of ballast
use).

305. See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 138, at 18-59 (setting forth the ignorance of nuisance defense).
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to the problems caused by exotic species, 306 shipowners possess the requisite means
of knowledge and thus this defense is foreclosed as well.
The final general defense, contributory negligence, is applicable save where
consequences are intended by the defendant. °7 Seawater ballast flushing is intended
as part of shipping practice,308 it is therefore intentional and this defense is not valid.

Therefore, none ofthe four general defenses will apply in a exotic species introduction nuisance suit. However, there are a number of specific defenses a
shipowner may raise in an exotic species introduction suit. First, because exotic
species are merely natural species displaced, the shipping industry will likely
defend their actions as a normal use, however, there are no defenses for the user of
land who claims usual, familiar or normal use. Rather, any type of use which
qualifies as usual, familiar and normal on land which subjects neighbors to

substantial annoyance, or causes material damage to their property, is prima facie 3 9
not a "reasonable" use.310 Therefore, the shipping industry will not be able to defend
exotic species introduction as a normal use.

Secondly, in certain cases the shipping industry will claim that the fishing
industry has made themselves extra sensitive to exotic species. These fishermen

will not have a cause of action because persons who are bringing the nuisance
action will not have a cause of action where they have by their actions made themselves exceptionally vulnerable to the actions of the defendant. 31' Therefore, the
shipping industry will have a valid defense against fishermen who make themselves

extra sensitive.
A third possible defense is consent to the risk of damages caused by exotic
species. Because the sea is considered a highway on which traffic cannot traverse
without risk, persons with adjacent property may well be found to consent to that

306. See generally Perman,supra note 2, at Al (describing the serious disruption to the ecology ofestuarine
waters brought on by the introduction of the alien Green Crab who preys upon local shellfish); see also Stein, supra
note 2, at 1 (reporting that devastation of ecosystems by the introduction of exotic species creates monocultures in
which only one type of plant or animal flourishes).
307. See CLERK & LINDSELL, supranote 138, at 18-62 (stating that contributory negligence is a defense to
a nuisance action).
308. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 34, at 381 (stating the ballast water is taken in and pumped out at
the harbors).
309. See BLACKS LAw DIcToNARY 1189 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "prima facie" as "a fact presumed to be
true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary").
310. See WEMt, supra note 141, at 351 (quoting from Watt v. Jamieson, Court of Session, 1954 S.C. 56
demonstrating the non-existence of the normal use exception); see also id. at 349 (quoting from St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, House of Lords (1865) 11 H.L.Cas. 642, 35 LJ.Q.B. 66; 12 L.T. 776, 29 J.P. 579, 11
Jur.(N.S.) 785, 13 W.R. 1083, 11 E.R. 1483, regarding an exception for a user who has acquired an prescriptive
right by lengthened use to the nonpermissable normal use defense).
311. See WEn, supranote 141, at 352 (quoting from Bridlington Relay Ltd. v. Yorkshire Electricity Board,
Chancery [1965] Ch. 436; [1965] 2 W.L.R. 349; 109 Si. 12; [1965] 1 All E.R. 264) (stating that a man cannot
increase the liabilities of his neighbor by applying his property to special uses for residential or business purposes).
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risk, 12 with no liability resulting from the defendants actions. This defense may
only apply to physical damages and may not affect a suit for damage to fishing
rights.
Therefore, the only valid defense, although unlikely, is the possibility that a
fishing industry plaintiff has made themselves extra sensitive to exotic species.
However, prudent planning by the fishing industry will effectively remove this
defense.
IV. CONCLUSION

Thus, England has laws that appear to make an exotic species introduction suit
feasible. Although causation currently inhibits an exotic species suit, the issue of
causation will inevitably be resolved.
Therefore, the international shipping industry has been granted a grace period
in which to bring their affairs in order without any suit brought against them.
However, scientific progress goes by no persons clock, and no person really knows
how long this grace period will last. It is then in the best interests of the shipping
industry to make substantial efforts in the development of technology to prevent
exotic species introduction prior to the suit becoming a reality. This outcome will
achieve the twin goals of both prevention of exotic species introduction, and
economic efficiency.

312. See BATES, supra note 88, at 67 (discussing the limitations of Rylands v. Fletcher's application by
property owners adjacent to the water).
313. See supra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing causation in a potential exotic species

introduction suit).

